Africa Accounts for 30% of Rosoboronexport’s Defense Orders as Russia Deepens Military-Technical Ties With 46 Countries

Africa accounts for 30% of orders from Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state intermediary for defense-related trade, as Moscow strengthens its military-technical ties with the continent, according to Alexander Mikheev, the company’s Director General and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Union of Machine-Builders.

Speaking on Africa Day, Mikheev said contracts for technological cooperation projects with African nations are worth about $1.7 billion, and the company has signed intergovernmental agreements on military-technical cooperation with 46 African countries. Rosoboronexport has executed roughly $20 billion worth of deals across 150 contracts, supplying Russian defense products and supporting infrastructure projects. Mikheev emphasized that Russia’s friendship with African nations is built on decades of respect and trust, noting the country’s history of offering comprehensive assistance, including reliable and effective weapons, to support their struggles for independence, justice, and freedom.

The company is prepared to consider a wide range of industrial cooperation options, including licensed and joint production, development of advanced weapons and military equipment, modernization, post-sale service, and maintenance. Rosoboronexport interacts with its African partners both at international trade fairs and on a bilateral basis, including through Rostec State Corporation’s representative offices based in key countries of the continent.

Key Developments: The Scale of Russian Defense Engagement, Contract Values, and Technological Cooperation

The disclosure that Africa accounts for 30% of Rosoboronexport’s orders is a remarkable statistic, given the global nature of the defense trade market. Africa is not the largest market for arms (the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions are larger), but it is a strategic priority for Russia, which has been expanding its influence across the continent amid competition with China, the United States, and European powers.

The 46 African countries with which Russia has signed intergovernmental agreements on military-technical cooperation represent the vast majority of the continent’s 54 nations. Only a handful of countries—including those with strong Western military ties (e.g., Ghana, perhaps? The article does not specify which countries are not partners)—do not have such agreements. The prevalence of these agreements provides a legal framework for arms sales, training, and technology transfer.

The $1.7 billion figure for technological cooperation projects is significant but not enormous. For context, the global arms trade is estimated at over $100 billion annually. Russia’s share of the African market is substantial but not dominant, as China, France, the United States, and other European countries also have significant arms sales to Africa.

The $20 billion spent across 150 contracts with African nations represents a long-term commitment. The contracts cover direct supply of defense items—including aircraft, helicopters, air defense systems, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, and ammunition—as well as infrastructure projects such as maintenance depots, training centers, and perhaps the construction of defense-related facilities.

Rosoboronexport’s willingness to consider licensed and joint production is a strategic evolution. Historically, Russia’s arms sales to Africa were transactional: cash (or resources) for equipment. Increasingly, African countries are demanding technology transfer and local production, both to build domestic industrial capacity and to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. Russia’s offer of licensed production could be a competitive advantage over Western suppliers, which are often reluctant to transfer technology due to intellectual property and export control concerns.

The mention of “post-sale service and maintenance” is also important. Many African countries that purchased Russian equipment during the Cold War have struggled to maintain it due to a lack of spare parts, technical expertise, and funding. Rosoboronexport’s commitment to after-sales service could improve the operational readiness of existing equipment and encourage repeat purchases.

The 1st International Security Forum, which began on May 26 at several venues in the Moscow Region, is a platform for Rosoboronexport to showcase its products and engage with African delegations. The forum likely includes exhibitions, demonstrations, and bilateral meetings. The participation of African nations signals continued interest in Russian defense products despite Western pressure to isolate Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.

Analysis & Implications: Russian Strategy, African Demand, and Geopolitical Competition

Russia’s defense engagement with Africa is part of a broader strategy to expand political and economic influence. Unlike China, which focuses on infrastructure investment and resource extraction, Russia’s comparative advantage is in security: arms sales, military training, and, increasingly, private military contractors (such as the Wagner Group, now absorbed into the Russian Ministry of Defence). For African governments facing insurgencies, terrorism, or political instability, Russian equipment and support are attractive, particularly when Western partners impose human rights conditions or are perceived as unreliable.

The demand for Russian equipment is driven by several factors. First, cost: Russian equipment is generally cheaper than Western equivalents, and financing terms are often more flexible. Second, compatibility: many African countries already operate Soviet-era or Russian equipment; buying Russian is easier than transitioning to Western systems. Third, availability: Russian delivery times are often shorter than Western ones, which can be delayed by export controls and bureaucratic processes. Fourth, political alignment: African governments that are uncomfortable with Western democracy promotion may prefer a partner that does not lecture them on governance.

The competition with China is nuanced. China is also a major arms supplier to Africa, offering drones, armored vehicles, and small arms. However, China’s defense engagement is less visible than its economic engagement. Russia has a longer history of military-technical cooperation with Africa, dating back to the Cold War when the Soviet Union supported liberation movements. That history, combined with Russia’s willingness to sell advanced systems (including air defense and combat aircraft), gives it an edge.

The Western response has been mixed. The United States and European Union have imposed sanctions on Russia, including restrictions on defense exports. However, those sanctions have not prevented Russia from selling arms to Africa; they have made it more difficult to process payments, but creative financing (including barter arrangements) has circumvented the restrictions. Some African governments have faced US pressure under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which threatens sanctions on countries that engage in significant transactions with Russia’s defense sector. The threat has not deterred all countries; some have calculated that the risk of US sanctions is outweighed by the benefit of Russian equipment.

The Wagner Group’s integration into the Russian Ministry of Defence has changed the calculus. Previously, Wagner operated as a private military company, providing services that could be denied by the Russian state. Now, Wagner is officially part of the Russian military apparatus, meaning that its activities are state-sanctioned and likely coordinated with Rosoboronexport. For African governments, this provides a more formal, reliable relationship, but it also increases the risk of entanglement in Russia’s geopolitical conflicts.

The Accra Street Journal notes that Ghana’s defense relationships are diversified. Ghana purchases equipment from a variety of sources, including Russia? The article does not specify. Ghana has historically purchased from Western countries (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany) as well as from China and Russia. The country’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions requires interoperability with Western equipment, which may limit its appetite for Russian systems. However, Ghana could be a potential customer for Russian equipment for internal security operations.

What This Means for African Security, Sovereignty, and Defense Industrialization

For African security, Russian arms and military-technical cooperation provide capabilities that many African governments would otherwise lack. Air power (helicopters, fighter jets), air defense systems, and armored vehicles are expensive and technically complex; few African countries can afford to purchase and maintain them without external support. Russian equipment, while not always state-of-the-art, is rugged, reliable, and suitable for African conditions.

For African sovereignty, the relationship with Russia is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it provides an alternative to Western dependence, allowing African governments to diversify their security partnerships. On the other hand, it can create new dependencies: once a country purchases Russian equipment, it is locked into Russian supply chains for spare parts, ammunition, and training. Switching to Western equipment is costly. The Russian offer of licensed and joint production could mitigate this dependency, but only if African countries actually acquire the capacity to manufacture.

For defense industrialization, the Russian offer of licensed production is a potential game-changer. South Africa has a domestic defense industry (Denel), but it has struggled. Nigeria has ambitions to develop domestic production. Egypt has licensed production of Russian equipment. Other African countries could follow suit, building the industrial base to manufacture, maintain, and upgrade their own equipment. However, licensed production requires a level of technical capacity, infrastructure, and financing that many African countries lack.

The human rights dimension is unavoidable. Russia’s human rights record is poor, and its military has been accused of war crimes in Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere. African governments that purchase Russian equipment must weigh the security benefits against the reputational risks. Civil society groups in Africa have raised concerns about Russian involvement, particularly in the Sahel, where Wagner has been accused of abuses. The African Union and regional bodies (ECOWAS, SADC) have not taken a strong stance, leaving individual countries to make their own calculations.

The Accra Street Journal’s assessment: Russia’s defense engagement with Africa is a reality that Western powers cannot ignore. The 30% share of orders, the 46 intergovernmental agreements, and the $20 billion in contracts are evidence of deep and growing ties. African governments see Russia as a useful partner, providing equipment and support without the conditionality that Western partners often impose. The West can respond by offering better terms—more affordable financing, faster delivery, technology transfer, and respect for sovereignty—or it can watch as Russia expands its influence.

Wider Context: Global Arms Trade and Africa’s Position

The global arms trade is concentrated in a few major suppliers: the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Africa is a relatively small market, accounting for approximately 5% to 10% of global arms imports, but it is a growing one. As African economies expand and security challenges persist, demand for arms is likely to increase.

Russia’s share of the African arms market has fluctuated over time. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a major supplier to African liberation movements and allied governments. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s presence declined, but it has rebounded since the mid-2000s. The war in Ukraine has not slowed Russia’s arms sales to Africa; if anything, it has increased Russia’s motivation to find new customers.

The United States remains a major arms supplier to Africa, but its sales are often tied to counter-terrorism cooperation and other policy objectives. China’s arms sales to Africa have grown rapidly, particularly in unmanned aerial vehicles (drones). France and the United Kingdom maintain ties to their former colonies. Turkey has emerged as a new supplier, particularly of drones and armored vehicles. The market is competitive, and African governments have choices.

The transfer of technology and licensed production is a growing trend. South Africa has licensed production of European and Russian equipment. Nigeria has expressed interest in developing domestic manufacturing. Egypt has a substantial domestic defense industry. As African countries industrialize, they will demand more than just finished products; they will want to build their own capacity.

The link between arms sales and broader geopolitical alignment is complex. Countries that purchase Russian arms are often perceived as being aligned with Moscow, but the correlation is not perfect. Some countries purchase arms from both Russia and the West, maintaining a balancing act. Others purchase from Russia because it is the only supplier willing to sell certain systems.

The Accra Street Journal’s conclusion: Africa’s defense relationships are diversifying. Russia is a major player, but not the only one. African governments should seek to balance their partnerships, avoiding excessive dependence on any single supplier. The goal should be to acquire the capabilities needed to address security challenges, while building domestic capacity over time. Rosoboronexport’s offer of licensed production and technology transfer is an opportunity. Whether African countries can seize it depends on their own industrial policies.

Source: Accra Street Journal

Last Updated on May 28, 2026 by Samuel Kwame Boadu

Samuel Kwame Boadu

Samuel Kwame Boadu is a Ghanaian media entrepreneur and storyteller with a passion for amplifying urban voices and uncovering everyday truths. He is the Editor-in-Chief and Founder of Accra Street Journal, a dynamic digital platform dedicated to capturing the pulse of Ghana’s capital—its people, culture, challenges, business, sports and innovations.

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