Introduction: The Hidden Cost of a Common Ingredient
Every day, across Ghana, tomatoes form the base of the nation’s cuisine. From the rich stews that accompany banku and kenkey to the jollof rice that graces Sunday tables, the red fruit is indispensable. But behind this everyday ingredient lies a troubling economic reality: Ghana has become the world’s second-largest importer of tomato paste, trailing only Germany, while spending up to GHS 760 million annually on fresh and processed tomatoes .
This dependence on imports—particularly from neighbouring Burkina Faso—is draining the economy far beyond the visible import bill. According to a recent analysis by Isaac Kofi Tsoenamawu, Ghana loses approximately GHS 5.7 billion annually —equivalent to 1.2 per cent of GDP —to tomato import dependency, inefficient production, and a lack of value-added infrastructure . Of this staggering sum, up to GHS 4.5 billion represents potential wages lost because of underdeveloped local production and processing, while GHS 180 million to 220 million reflects forgone tax revenue tied to non-existent jobs and businesses in the domestic value chain .
This article explores the structural gaps in Ghana’s tomato industry, the risks of over-reliance on Burkina Faso, the jobs and revenue being lost, and the investments needed to reverse a crisis that touches every Ghanaian household.
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The Import Bill: By the Numbers
Ghana’s Place in the Global Tomato Market
Ghana’s tomato import dependence is staggering by any measure
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual import bill (fresh tomatoes + paste) | GHS 650 – 760 million |
| Fresh tomato imports | ~100,000 metric tons annually |
| Tomato paste imports | ~100,000 metric tons annually |
| Global ranking for tomato paste imports | 2nd in the world (after Germany) |
*Sources: *
This import reliance has not emerged overnight. It is the result of decades of underinvestment in irrigation, post-harvest infrastructure, and processing capacity. While Ghana’s climate and soil are suitable for tomato cultivation, the country lacks the systems to sustain year-round production, leaving it dependent on imports to fill the gap between harvest seasons .
The True Cost: GHS 5.7 Billion Lost Annually
The direct import bill—while significant—is only the tip of the iceberg. According to Tsoenamawu’s analysis, the broader economic cost of tomato import dependency reaches GHS 5.7 billion per year, or 1.2 per cent of GDP . This figure accounts for:
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Potential wages lost due to underdeveloped local production and processing: up to GHS 4.5 billion
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Forgone tax revenue from non-existent jobs and businesses in the domestic value chain: GHS 180 – 220 million
-
Post-harvest losses from inadequate storage and processing facilities: GHS 175 – 250 million
In other words, every cedi spent on imported tomatoes represents not just the cost of the product itself, but the loss of jobs that could have been created locally, taxes that could have funded public services, and wealth that could have circulated within Ghana’s economy .
The Burkina Faso Dependency: A Precarious Partnership
Why Burkina Faso?
Ghana’s tomato imports come predominantly from Burkina Faso, Ghana’s northern neighbour. Burkinabe tomatoes are valued for their longer shelf life, lower production costs, and the consistency of supply they provide during Ghana’s off-seasons . For years, this cross-border trade has bridged the gap between Ghana’s domestic harvests and year-round demand.
But this dependency carries significant risks that have become increasingly apparent.
Recent Disruptions: Attacks and Export Restrictions
The fragility of this supply chain was exposed in recent months. Attacks on traders transporting tomatoes across the border have disrupted supply flows, while Burkina Faso’s own export restrictions—imposed to manage domestic shortages—have further constrained availability .
These disruptions have immediate consequences for Ghanaian consumers and businesses:
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Price volatility: When supplies tighten, prices spike unpredictably
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Availability gaps: Processing industries that rely on consistent tomato inputs face production delays
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Household impact: Families pay more for a staple ingredient or substitute with lower-quality alternatives
The Security Dimension
Beyond economic considerations, the dependence on imports from Burkina Faso introduces a security dimension. Burkina Faso has faced significant political instability and security challenges in recent years, including recurring attacks by militant groups . Any escalation in instability could disrupt supply chains with little warning, leaving Ghana scrambling to fill a critical gap in its food system .
Post-Harvest Losses: A National Tragedy
Up to 45 Per Cent Lost
Perhaps the most heartbreaking aspect of Ghana’s tomato crisis is the sheer volume of domestic production that goes to waste. Between 20 and 50 per cent of tomatoes grown in Ghana are lost after harvest due to inadequate storage and processing facilities .
| Crop | Estimated Post-Harvest Loss |
|---|---|
| Tomatoes | 20–50% |
| Economic value lost annually | GHS 175 – 250 million |
These losses occur at multiple points in the supply chain:
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Harvest: Lack of proper containers leads to bruising and spoilage
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Transport: Poor roads and inadequate vehicles cause damage during transit
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Storage: Limited cold storage facilities allow fresh produce to rot within days
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Processing: Insufficient processing capacity means surplus harvest cannot be preserved
The Irrigation Gap
One of the root causes of Ghana’s seasonal shortages is the lack of year-round irrigation. Ghana’s tomato cultivation is heavily dependent on rainfall, leading to a glut during harvest seasons and scarcity during dry periods . Without the ability to grow tomatoes year-round, the country is forced to import during off-seasons—and to watch much of its harvest waste during glut periods when supply exceeds storage and processing capacity .
The Pwalugu Dam: A Stalled Solution
The Pwalugu Multi-Purpose Dam project, originally conceived as a transformative infrastructure investment, remains stalled . If operational, the dam would provide irrigation for thousands of hectares of agricultural land in the Upper East Region, enabling consistent tomato cultivation, reducing seasonal shortages, and lessening the reliance on imports .
The project represents not just a missed irrigation opportunity but a symbol of the broader infrastructure gaps that perpetuate Ghana’s import dependency .
Domestic Processing: Only 7 Per Cent Locally Sourced
The Paste Problem
One of the most striking statistics in Tsoenamawu’s analysis is that only about 7 per cent of tomatoes used in processed products are sourced domestically . The vast majority of tomato paste consumed in Ghana is imported as concentrated paste and simply repackaged for sale .
This means that almost all the value addition in tomato processing—the jobs, the tax revenue, the industrial capacity—occurs outside Ghana’s borders . The country exports raw foreign exchange to import a processed product that it could theoretically produce domestically, given the right infrastructure and investment.
The Value-Added Gap
The domestic processing gap has multiple dimensions:
| Gap | Consequence |
|---|---|
| Industrial capacity | Few facilities to turn fresh tomatoes into paste |
| Technology deficit | Limited access to modern processing equipment |
| Quality standards | Difficulty meeting industrial specifications |
| Financing constraints | High capital costs deter investment |
Until these gaps are addressed, Ghana will remain primarily a consumer of imported processed tomato products rather than a producer of value-added goods for its own market—or for export .
The Jobs and Revenue Story: What Ghana Is Missing
Potential Wages: GHS 4.5 Billion
Perhaps the most compelling argument for investing in domestic tomato production and processing is the job creation potential. According to Tsoenamawu’s estimates, Ghana loses up to GHS 4.5 billion annually in potential wages due to underdeveloped local production and processing .
This figure represents what could be earned by:
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Farmers cultivating tomatoes year-round with reliable irrigation
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Workers in processing facilities converting fresh tomatoes into paste
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Transporters moving produce from farm to factory to market
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Traders and retailers selling locally produced and processed products
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Exporters marketing Ghanaian tomato products to regional markets
Each of these jobs would generate income that circulates within the local economy, supporting families, funding education, and driving further economic activity .
Forgone Tax Revenue: GHS 180–220 Million
The absence of a robust domestic tomato industry also means forgone tax revenue. Tsoenamawu estimates that Ghana loses between GHS 180 million and 220 million annually in tax revenue that would be generated by businesses and jobs in the domestic value chain .
This revenue could fund:
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School infrastructure
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Healthcare facilities
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Road maintenance
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Agricultural extension services
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Social protection programmes
Instead, the tax base remains narrower than it could be, and public services remain under-resourced .
Economic Impact Summary
| Category | Annual Loss (GHS) |
|---|---|
| Direct import bill | 650 – 760 million |
| Potential wages lost | Up to 4.5 billion |
| Forgone tax revenue | 180 – 220 million |
| Post-harvest losses | 175 – 250 million |
| Total economic cost | ~5.7 billion (1.2% of GDP) |
What Needs to Change: A Roadmap for Reform
1. Invest in Irrigation Infrastructure
The most fundamental constraint to year-round tomato production is water. Ghana must prioritize investment in irrigation infrastructure, including:
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Completion of stalled projects like the Pwalugu Multi-Purpose Dam
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Development of small-scale irrigation schemes in tomato-growing regions
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Promotion of efficient irrigation technologies (drip, sprinkler systems)
2. Build Cold Storage and Processing Facilities
To reduce post-harvest losses and capture value domestically, Ghana needs:
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Cold storage facilities at strategic locations to extend shelf life
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Processing plants capable of turning fresh tomatoes into paste, canned tomatoes, and other value-added products
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Aggregation centres where farmers can bring produce for sorting, grading, and distribution
3. Improve Logistics and Transport Networks
Better roads and transport infrastructure would:
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Reduce damage during transit
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Enable farmers in remote areas to reach markets
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Lower transport costs, improving farmer profitability
4. Provide Financing for Farmers and Processors
Access to affordable credit remains a major barrier for both tomato farmers and aspiring processors. Targeted agricultural financing programmes could:
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Enable farmers to invest in improved seeds, irrigation equipment, and storage
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Allow processors to acquire modern equipment
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Support the development of farmer cooperatives for collective marketing
5. Strengthen Farmer Organizations and Extension Services
Better-organized farmers and improved access to extension services would:
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Improve farming practices and yields
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Facilitate collective bargaining for better prices
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Enable better coordination between farmers and processors
6. Develop a National Tomato Strategy
What Ghana lacks is a coherent, long-term strategy for the tomato subsector. A national tomato strategy would:
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Set clear targets for import substitution
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Coordinate investments across ministries and agencies
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Provide a framework for public-private partnerships
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Establish quality standards for domestic production
Conclusion: A Choice Between Import Dependence and Self-Reliance
The story of Ghana’s tomato import dependency is not new, but its costs are now clearer than ever. The country spends up to GHS 760 million annually on imported tomatoes and paste . It loses GHS 5.7 billion —more than 1 per cent of GDP—to inefficiencies, wasted produce, and forgone jobs and taxes . It has become the world’s second-largest importer of tomato paste, a ranking that reflects failure, not success .
And it has tied its food security to a precarious supply chain from Burkina Faso—a neighbour facing its own political and security challenges .
Yet the solutions are within reach. Ghana has the land, the climate, and the people to produce its own tomatoes year-round. It has the potential to build processing industries that create jobs, generate tax revenue, and add value before products leave the country . It has the opportunity to turn a national embarrassment into a source of pride and prosperity .
What is missing is the political will, the sustained investment, and the long-term vision to make it happen. The Pwalugu Dam, stalled for years, represents a choice deferred. The GHS 4.5 billion in lost wages represents opportunity squandered. The 45 per cent post-harvest loss represents harvests that could have fed families, generated income, and built livelihoods .
The question is not whether Ghana can produce its own tomatoes. It can. The question is whether the country will finally make the investments needed to turn potential into reality—or continue paying the price of import dependence in lost jobs, lost revenue, and a food system that remains vulnerable to shocks beyond its borders.
Source: Accra Street Journal
Last Updated on March 22, 2026 by Samuel Kwame Boadu
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Samuel Kwame Boadu is a Ghanaian media entrepreneur and storyteller with a passion for amplifying urban voices and uncovering everyday truths. He is the Editor-in-Chief and Founder of Accra Street Journal, a dynamic digital platform dedicated to capturing the pulse of Ghana’s capital—its people, culture, challenges, business, sports and innovations.


